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Introduction
“Mold.” For homeowners, it is one of the most repugnant four-letter words in the
English language. The thought of mold growing beneath the sink or behind the refrigerator is
decidedly unpleasant. Its unsightly appearance and foul odor make mold an unwelcome intruder
in any household. Usually, homeowners who discover mold colonizing in dark, hidden spaces
can kill the intruder by identifying and removing the source of moisture feeding its growth.
However, if the problem is identified too late, or if the exposure to moisture is too widespread,
mold-related loss may be inevitable. For example, if pipes behind drywall begin to leak and
there are no signs of the escaped water, the problem will likely go unnoticed, and the homeowner
may soon be dealing with a structural mold infestation that could be costly, or even impossible,
to fix. In 2004, the average cost of mold remediation for a 2,000-square-foot home or business
was approximately $40,000.1
When faced with a mold-related loss, the first question homeowners are likely to ask is
whether they are insured for the expenses. Public insurance adjusters can help homeowners
evaluate their coverage for mold damage and guide them through the claims adjusting process.2
As representatives of the insured, it is important that public adjusters and policyholders’
attorneys understand the current state of insurance law on first-party property claims for mold
damage. Often, their clients will assume that because they purchased an “all-risk” homeowner’s
policy, their claim for mold-related repairs must be covered.3 What they may not realize is that
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between 2001 and 2005, insurance companies quietly amended homeowner’s policies by adding
endorsements that exclude coverage for mold damage. According to David Dybdahl, a noted
expert in the field of insurance and risk management, insurance companies “blasted through
more policies than anything in history -- faster than terrorism, asbestos or pollution. They quietly
excluded [mold damage coverage] from everyone's policies, and they got away with it.”4 But did
they? Did insurance companies, through mold exclusion endorsements, negate the coverage they
formerly offered for mold damage under “all-risk” homeowner’s insurance policies?
This paper seeks to answer this important coverage question by analyzing how courts
have responded to mold exclusions in “all-risk” policies. Part I examines the history behind the
advent of mold exclusions, focusing on Ballard v. Fire Insurance Exchange, a case that drew
national attention to mold as a major financial liability for insurance companies.5 Part II
addresses ambiguity in the traditional mold exclusion through a discussion of the Supreme Court
of Texas’s plain meaning analysis in Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds,6 a decision that one wellregarded authority on insurance coverage has deemed one of the ten most significant coverage
decisions of 2006.7 In Part III, the plain meaning interpretation of the mold exclusion in Feiss is
juxtaposed with an emerging legal analysis of ‘loss’ versus ‘cause of loss,’ which has divided the
courts and cast doubt on whether the traditional mold exclusion language is unambiguous. Part
IV discusses how a policyholder who reasonably believes he or she is covered for mold damage
can use the efficient proximate cause doctrine to challenge a carrier’s claim denial even if the
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policy language is technically unambiguous. This section also addresses anti-concurrent
causation clauses and their impact on efficient proximate cause arguments. The last Part, Part V,
examines notice requirements for amendments to homeowner’s policies, a critical consideration
in all coverage disputes, especially as they relate to mold. The paper concludes by examining the
future direction insurers are likely to take in their mold exclusion provisions and the ways public
insurance adjusters and policyholders’ attorneys can respond to mold exclusions.
I – Ballard v. State Farm Exchange and the Advent of the Mold Exclusion
The new millennium ushered in many unanticipated events: high speed Internet access, a
Boston Red Sox World Series Championship, and an unprecedented rise in mold litigation. The
statistics are staggering: in 1998, only 129 mold-related insurance claims were filed nationally.8
By 2001, this number had skyrocketed to 9,563.9 Despite this rapid surge in mold claims, the
financial impact on insurers was minimal at first. In 2000, Texas insurers were settling most
mold claims for a few thousand dollars.10 However, as attention to what some were calling “the
next asbestos” grew, the potential dangers of mold spread across headlines and into the national
consciousness.11 “Lurking, Choking, Toxic Mold” was the cover story in the August 2001
edition of the New York Times magazine.12 And for readers of the Washington Post, the attitude
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toward mold was no less threatening: the attention-grabbing headline “Exorcizing a Mold
Monster” surely had homeowners thinking about whether their property or health was at risk.13
As concern over mold swept across the nation, the eye of the inevitable legal storm that
would pit homeowners against insurers over coverage for mold damage was forming in the most
appropriate of places – Dripping Springs, Texas. There, homeowner Melinda Ballard had sued
Farmers Insurance Group (“Farmers Insurance”) for failing to adequately reimburse her for the
extensive mold damage to her eleven thousand square-foot home.14 Ballard accused Farmers
Insurance of intentionally delaying its investigation of her claim in an effort to avoid payment.
While Farmers Insurance stalled, toxic mold multiplied in Ballard’s home to the point where
virtually nothing in the house was salvageable and the house itself was no longer habitable.15
Although Ballard was partially a dispute over coverage, the central issue was whether
Farmers Insurance acted in bad faith in its handling of the claim. The jury’s verdict in June 2001
not only found that Ballard had been covered, it also heavily penalized Farmers Insurance for
bad faith: Ballard was awarded $6.2 million for her property damage claims, $17 million for her
bad faith claim, and $8.9 million in legal fees.16 While a Texas appellate court later reduced the
$32 million award considerably,17 the jury’s decision sent property insurers scrambling to look
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for ways to lawfully deny coverage for future mold claims.18 Thus, from the ashes of Ballard,
the mold exclusion was born.
II – Interpreting the Mold Exclusion: Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds and Plain Meaning
Today, a person examining his or her homeowner’s insurance policy, including all recent
endorsements, will likely find a clause similar to the following: “We [the insurer] do not cover
loss caused by … mold.”19 This limitation on coverage, known as a mold exclusion, is the
insurance industry’s answer for precluding future mold claims. During the summer of 2006, the
meaning of the mold exclusion was tested in Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds,20 another high-profile
Texas insurance case involving a first-party mold claim. However, unlike in Ballard, this time
the Texas judicial system handed the insurance industry – and the mold exclusion provision – a
victory.
In Fiess, the claimants, Richard and Stephanie Fiess, discovered advanced black mold
covering exposed interior sheetrock shortly after Tropical Storm Allison flooded their home in
2001.21 To learn more about the potential risks of the mold, the Fiesses hired a biological testing
expert to inspect their home.22 He determined that the home was contaminated by at least six
different strains of mold, including the toxic stachybotrys strain, and concluded that the house
was dangerous to inhabit.23 He further concluded that seventy percent of the mold growing in
the home was caused by plumbing, roof, and other leaks, and was therefore unrelated to water
18
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intrusions from Allison.24 Based on these findings, the Fiesses submitted a claim to their
homeowner’s insurer, State Farm, for mold-related loss due to pre-Allison water damage.25 They
did not claim any mold-related loss caused by Allison because their homeowner’s policy
explicitly excluded damage as a result of flooding.26 When State Farm refused to reimburse the
family for the full value of their claim for pre-Allison mold damage, the Fiesses sued State Farm
for breach of contract and fraud.27
After a lengthy procedural history, the Supreme Court of Texas, on certification from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, was asked to determine whether the policy’s
language provided coverage.28 The language of the Fiesses’ policy read as follows:
We do not cover loss caused by: …
(2) rust, rot, mold or other fungi …
We do cover ensuing loss caused by collapse of the building or any part of the building,
water damage, or breakage of glass which is part of the building if the loss would
otherwise be covered under this policy.29
To understand each party’s position on the coverage dispute, one must first look to the following
language in the clause: “We do not cover loss caused by … mold.” In State Farm’s brief, it
argued that the plain meaning of this traditional mold exclusion provision excluded coverage for
the Fiesses’ mold damage.30 Additionally, State Farm argued that the second half of the above
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clause, known as an ensuing loss provision, did not cover the Fiesses’ mold damage because the
provision’s causation requirements were not satisfied.31 The Fiesses, on the other hand, argued
that the ensuing loss provision acted as an exception to the mold exclusion which covered loss
caused by water damage, or in their case, mold.32
Between each party’s brief and the numerous amicus briefs filed in the case, the Supreme
Court of Texas received many different opinions on the scope of coverage under the ensuing loss
provision. At the center of the dispute over the provision’s coverage was how the phrases
“ensuing loss” and “otherwise … covered” should be interpreted in the context of the policy.
According to the Fiesses, if mold results or ensues from a covered water damage event, such as a
dishwasher hose that bursts and saturates the kitchen floor, the ensuing loss provision covers any
mold-related loss notwithstanding the plain meaning of the mold exclusion.33 This interpretation
does not conflict with the “otherwise … covered” language in the provision, the Fiesses argued,
because the mold exclusion and the ensuing loss provision appear in the same section of the
policy. Under their interpretation, “otherwise … covered” refers to perils covered beyond the
scope of the section containing the mold exclusion and the accompanying ensuing loss provision.
Because no other part of their homeowner’s policy denied coverage for mold, the Fiesses argued
that they were insured for their mold damage.34
In its reply brief, State Farm argued that the Fiesses’ interpretation of the ensuing loss
provision was faulty because it attached no meaning to the word “ensuing,” a material term, and
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therefore violated the rule of contract interpretation that each word be given effect.35 Stated
differently, under the Fiesses’ interpretation, the phrases “loss caused by … water damage” and
“ensuing loss caused by … water damage” have the same meaning, rendering the word
“ensuing” redundant. Conversely, State Farm’s interpretation of the ensuing loss provision was
that if one’s home sustains water damage, the water damage loss may still be covered even
though an excluded peril, such as rust, caused the water damage.36 Therefore, instead of serving
as an exception to the exclusionary language, State Farm maintained that the ensuing loss
provision safeguards coverage for loss from covered perils that otherwise might be denied
because the covered peril arose from an excluded event.37 Finally, State Farm argued that even if
mold damage constituted an ensuing loss, the loss is still not “otherwise … covered under this
policy” because of the express and unambiguous language in the mold exclusion.38
Though both the Fiesses’ interpretation and the State Farm interpretation of the ensuing
loss provision have partial intuitive appeal, neither is without flaw. The Fiesses’ interpretation of
the meaning of “ensuing loss” is attractive because it offers a simple, straightforward approach
that finds coverage for “ensuing loss caused by … water damage.” Mold contamination
certainly is a loss that can ensue or result from significant water damage, and appears to fit
squarely within the meaning of the clause. On the other hand, while the Fiesses’ interpretation of
the meaning of “ensuing loss” is feasible, their argument regarding the “otherwise … covered”
clause is suspect. When interpreting insurance policies, one factor courts consider is how the
35
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general public would read the plain meaning of the language.39 It is doubtful that the ordinary
consumer would interpret the word “otherwise” to mean that mold damage is sometimes covered
when the foregoing provision states that it is excluded. Therefore, as the Texas high court
concluded, “Those exclusions (for rust, rot, mold, and fungi) are part of the policy; a policy
without exclusions for rust, rot, mold, wear and tear, and termites is simply a different policy.”40
While the Fiesses’ argument concerning the “otherwise … covered” clause is dubious,
State Farm’s argument about what constitutes an “ensuing loss” is equally unconvincing.
Nothing in the provision indicates that an excluded loss must cause the water damage in order for
there to be coverage for the water damage loss. Although State Farm argues that the modifier
“ensuing” requires that an excluded peril cause the resultant water damage for coverage to apply,
the meaning of “ensuing loss” appears limited to its relationship with water damage, a proximate
cause. Therefore, the average member of the public construing the ensuing loss provision would
not conclude that an excluded peril had to cause the water damage for coverage to apply to water
damage loss. Nevertheless, not all of State Farm’s arguments suffered from questionable logic.
As the carrier argued in its brief and as the Supreme Court of Texas concluded, the most
reasonable interpretation of the “otherwise … covered” clause in the ensuing loss provision
appears to exclude coverage for mold damage.41
As the analysis above shows, much of the debate leading up to the Supreme Court of
Texas’s decision in Fiess concerned the scope of coverage under the ensuing loss provision.
While the court’s opinion does address the ensuing loss arguments, the majority was more
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concerned with the meaning of the language that it found clear: the language of the mold
exclusion. According to the court: “The policy here provides that it does not cover ‘loss caused
by mold.’ While other parts of the policy sometimes make it difficult to decipher, we cannot
hold that mold damage is covered when the policy expressly says that it is not.”42 In this
interpretation, the court found that the mold exclusion was plainly unambiguous.
III – The “Unambiguous” Mold Exclusion: A Case of False Clarity?
Though the Supreme Court of Texas in Feiss found no ambiguity in the policy’s
traditional mold exclusion, other courts interpreting the same language – “We [the insurer] do
not cover loss caused by mold” – have found the provision ambiguous under a different
analysis.43 In both Liristis v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company and Simonetti v.
Selective Insurance Company, a covered water peril caused mold damage to the policyholders’
homes.44 Their insurers, like in Fiess, denied their claims for mold coverage on the basis that
loss caused by mold was excluded.45 Thereafter, the policyholders filed claims against their
insurers for breach of contract and bad faith, arguing that the traditional mold exclusions in their
homeowner’s policies were inapplicable because their claims were for mold as a loss in itself
(“mold loss”) rather than loss caused by mold, only the latter of which was not covered under
their policies’ mold exclusions.46
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In agreeing with the policyholders’ argument distinguishing mold as a ‘loss’ versus
‘cause of loss,’ both the Liristis and Simonetti courts found that the language in the insurers’
traditional mold exclusions47 did not exclude coverage for mold in all circumstances.48 As the
court noted in Simonetti:
This language does not exclude all mold. Rather, it excludes loss “caused by” or
resulting from mold. The language clearly focuses on “cause” of the loss, conveying the
intention to exclude mold as a cause of loss. But mold which is the loss is not
mentioned.49
Here, the Simonetti court implies that for an insurer to exclude all coverage for mold, the policy
must specifically state that coverage for mold as both a ‘loss’ and ‘cause of loss’ is excluded. In
other words, courts such as Simonetti and Liristis that follow the ‘loss’ versus ‘cause of loss’
rationale require that insurers clearly state in the mold exclusion whether mold as a ‘loss,’ a
‘cause of loss,’ or both are excluded.
Not every court that has considered the emerging ‘loss’ versus ‘cause of loss’ rationale
has recognized the distinction. For example, in Atlantic Mutual Insurance Companies v. Lotz,
the policyholders urged the court to apply the rationale to a mold exclusion that read, “[W]e
won’t pay for direct loss caused by deterioration or inherent vice. This includes … mold ….”50
Like in Liristis and Simonetti, the mold exclusion in Lotz did not differentiate between mold as a
‘loss’ and mold as a ‘cause of loss.’ The Lotz court, however, found the ‘loss’ versus ‘cause of
loss’ distinction immaterial to the question of coverage:
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It is self-evident that if there is a loss in the form of mold or rot, then the loss itself can be
directly caused by mold or rot, and there is no reason for Atlantic Mutual to add language
to its policy to make this any clearer: the meaning is obvious.51
Stated differently, the court is saying that mold is not limited to either one side or the other in the
cause-and-effect relationship: mold can cause mold loss. Consequently, it found the “loss caused
by mold” language in Atlantic Mutual’s mold exclusion sufficient to bar all coverage for mold.
While courts are presently divided on whether “all-risk” homeowner’s insurance policies
must specify coverage availability for mold as a ‘loss’ and ‘cause of loss,’ insurers would be
well-advised to use more precise policy language. To illustrate this need for greater clarity,
consider how a policyholder is likely to differentiate between ‘wind’ versus ‘loss caused by
wind’ and ‘mold’ versus ‘loss caused by mold.’ In the wind comparison, the two are easily
distinguishable because ‘wind’ can only be a cause of loss: the loss to the policyholder is left
behind in its wake. But in the mold comparison, the policyholder is unlikely to see a clear
dividing line between ‘mold’ and the loss it causes, and therefore could reasonably believe that
while coverage for loss caused by mold (such as replacing mold-infested drywall) is excluded,
coverage for treating and eradicating the mold itself is included. Therefore, because the
policyholder could reasonably believe that the phrase “we do not cover loss caused by mold”
does not bar coverage for mold loss, the law should require insurers to indicate that mold is
excluded as both a ‘loss’ and ‘cause of loss’ if they wish to broadly deny all coverage for mold.
IV – Causation versus Clarity in the Debate Over Mold Coverage
A. Efficient Proximate Cause
So far, this paper has shown that homeowners who become entangled in litigation with
their insurers over coverage for mold damage should first examine their policies for ambiguous
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language in the mold exclusion. But what if no such language exists, and the homeowner still
reasonably believes that his or her mold damage should be covered? What other arguments can
the homeowner raise, besides ambiguity, to challenge mold exclusions?
The majority of jurisdictions throughout the United States apply a doctrine known as
efficient proximate cause which policyholders can often use to argue in favor of coverage.52 The
doctrine of efficient proximate cause applies when a policyholder’s loss is the result of at least
two identifiable causes, one covered and one excluded.53 In such cases, jurisdictions that follow
the efficient proximate cause doctrine will, absent other considerations discussed later in this
paper, resolve the coverage dispute in favor of the insured if the covered cause of loss sets other
causes in motion which, in an unbroken sequence, give rise to the loss.54 From an insurance law
perspective, one of the interesting characteristics of mold as a cause of loss is that mold is very
often the last in a sequence of causes that result in damage to one’s home. This characteristic of
mold as a cause of loss means that homeowners can usually make an efficient proximate cause
argument in favor of coverage assuming they can identify a covered cause of loss in the chain of
causation that sets the other causes, including mold, in motion. Because mold, unlike some other
commonly excluded perils such as earthquakes and floods, is often the product of at least one
covered cause of loss, courts in jurisdictions that recognize efficient proximate cause frequently
find that counsel for aggrieved homeowners raise the doctrine when arguing that their client’s
homeowner’s policy covers damage from mold notwithstanding the policy’s mold exclusion.
52
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For example, in Bowers v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, a landlord brought suit against
her homeowner’s insurer after the insurer denied her claim for mold damage to a rental house in
which the tenants were secretly growing marijuana plants in the basement.55 To encourage plant
growth, the tenants had created an artificial environment of warm, moist air that caused mold to
develop and spread throughout the house.56 The insurer’s proffered reason for denying coverage
for the landlord’s mold damage was based on her policy’s mold exclusion, which read: “We do
not cover direct or indirect loss from … mold.”57 The insurer argued that the policyholder’s
property loss was caused by mold and therefore not covered under the plain meaning of the mold
exclusion.58 The landlord, on the other hand, reasoned that although mold was the immediate
cause of her loss, the predominate cause of loss that produced the mold growth was her tenants’
vandalism, a covered peril under her policy.59 Under such analysis, the tenants’ vandalism is
considered both an efficient cause and proximate cause, respectively, because their heinous
actions were responsible for the mold growth and there is no cause preceding their actions that
could reasonably be considered so closely and sufficiently connected with the mold damage for
the purpose of imposing liability.60
The Bowers court agreed with the landlord’s efficient proximate cause argument, noting:
“Here, there can be no reasonable difference of opinion regarding the cause of Ms. Bowers' loss.
It was the tenants' acts, which ‘in an unbroken sequence ... [produced] the result for which
55
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recovery is sought[.]’”61 Because the court concluded that reasonable minds could not disagree
that vandalism constituted the efficient proximate cause of the landlord’s loss, the court rendered
judgment in the landlord’s favor rather than remanding the issue as a question of fact for the
jury.62
B. Anti-Concurrent Causation
As Bowers demonstrates, in many cases it can be difficult for homeowner’s insurers to
defeat first-party mold claims in states such as Washington whose courts have shown a
willingness to reject the plain meaning of the mold exclusion if policyholders can show coverage
using the efficient proximate cause doctrine. In an effort to shift judicial outcomes of coverage
disputes back in their favor, insurers have responded by adding language to their policies known
as anti-concurrent causation clauses designed to further restrict the scope of coverage.63 These
clauses, as the following quoted policy language shows, place exclusionary policy provisions in
direct conflict with the efficient proximate cause doctrine because they deny coverage for loss
caused by an excluded peril “whether or not any other cause or event contributes concurrently or
in any sequence to the loss.”64 For example, if mold, an excluded peril, contaminates a home as
a result of a covered water event, the insurer will argue that the combination of the mold
exclusion and anti-concurrent causation clause bars coverage for mold damage irrespective of the
fact that the covered water event caused the sequence of events that produced the mold damage.

61

62

Bowers, 991 P.2d at 738.
Id.

63

David J. Rosenberg et al., Insurance Industry Woes in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina & Rita, 73 DEF.
COUNS. J. 141, 152 (2006).
64

Dahlke v. Home Owners Insurance Co., No. 239128, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 3424, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec.
23, 2003).

15

Courts often refer to the anti-concurrent causation clause as an insurer’s tool for contracting out
of the efficient proximate cause doctrine.65
Since insurers began supplementing their mold exclusions with anti-concurrent causation
clauses, the majority of jurisdictions have permitted these clauses to override the efficient
proximate cause doctrine.66 Some of the earliest and most insightful reasoning offered in support
of giving anti-concurrent causation clauses precedence over the efficient proximate cause
doctrine comes from the Supreme Court of Utah’s opinion in Alf v. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Company, a non-mold related case.67 In its discussion of State Farm’s recent addition
of a “lead-in” clause, or anti-concurrent causation clause, to its policy, and the clause’s
relationship to the efficient proximate cause doctrine, the court noted:
We believe that the proper path to follow is to recognize the efficient proximate cause
rule only when the parties have not chosen freely to contract out of it … [Therefore],
[W]e hold that the efficient proximate cause rule must yield to the qualifying words
agreed to by the parties and included in the Policy.68
The Supreme Court of Utah’s rationale for upholding the insurer’s anti-concurrent causation
language typifies the contractual analysis that most courts use when resolving the tension
between anti-concurrent causation and efficient proximate cause. So long as the meaning of a
policy’s exclusionary language is unambiguous and neither the exclusion nor the anti-concurrent
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causation clause is hidden or surrounded by a sea of confusing provisions, courts will interpret
the policy language as written.
Although insurance policies are contractual in nature, insurance companies prepare and
control the terms of their policies and offer coverage to homeowners on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. Moreover, because the policy language is often complicated even to skilled experts in the
field, policyholders are at an informational disadvantage in terms of policy understanding and
interpretation. For these reasons, insurance policies are referred to in law as contracts of
adhesion, which may call for a more consumer-oriented analysis than they receive in decisions
such as Alf, or in the context of a first-party mold claim, Dahlke v. Home Owners Insurance
Company.69
In Dahlke, a rare mid-winter Michigan thaw caused ice and snow to melt and leak
through the Dahlkes’ roof, causing significant damage to their ceiling and walls.70 In addition to
the ceiling and wall damage, the water intrusion also led to extensive mold growth, rendering the
home a total loss.71 Like in Alf, the court relied on the anti-concurrent causation language in the
claimants’ homeowner’s policy to deny the Dahlkes’ claim for mold damage despite the
Dahlkes’ reasonable expectation that the damage was covered under the efficient proximate
cause doctrine. In denying the Dahlkes’ claim, the court also acknowledged that their argument
was not without merit:
We are not unmindful of the concerns expressed to us regarding the number and breadth
of listed causes of loss that are excluded by the Home Owners' policy. Our interpretation
of the exclusion would result in denial of coverage for damage to covered property that
many insureds would ordinarily expect to be covered. … Nevertheless, these concerns do
69
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not provide grounds upon which we may rewrite the terms of the policy, and we must
apply the unambiguous terms of the policy in this case.72
Here, the court’s language indicates that while it thoroughly considered the Dahlkes’ efficient
proximate cause argument and their reasonable expectations, it nonetheless would not read the
policy differently from how it was written.
Although the courts’ reasoning in Alf and Dahlke represents how most courts analyze the
tension between efficient proximate cause and anti-concurrent causation in a homeowner’s
policy language, there are some notable exceptions. Courts in California, Washington State, and
West Virginia have issued decisions refusing to uphold anti-concurrent causation policy
provisions.73 In each of these decisions, the courts expressed strong concern that anti-concurrent
causation clauses would subvert policyholders’ reasonable expectations by allowing insurers to
argue that any excluded cause of loss in the chain of causation justifies their decision to deny the
claim, regardless of the policyholders’ competing arguments in favor of coverage. Courts that
favor this view believe that anti-concurrent causation clauses should not foreclose coverage
when an insured has legitimate reasons for believing he or she was covered for the loss.
V – Notification of Mold Exclusions and Other Material Coverage Diminishments
When a dispute over mold coverage arises, the policyholder, in addition to examining his
or her policy for ambiguity and issues of causation, should also determine whether the insurer’s
proffered reason for denying coverage is based on a subsequent amendment to the policy. Many,
if not all states, require that insurers notify homeowners through written policy endorsements if

72

Id. at *10-11.

73

See, e.g., Howell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 267 Cal.Rptr. 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Safeco Ins. Co. of
America v. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d 413 (Wash. 1989); Murray v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 509 S.E.2d 1
(W.Va. 1998).

18

they make changes to a policy that materially diminish coverage.74 The need to notify
policyholders of material diminishments to coverage is particularly important in relation to mold
because many homeowner’s policies prior to Ballard covered mold-related loss. Not only must
insurers notify their policyholders if they add a mold exclusion, but they must also notify
policyholders of more subtle changes in language that materially diminish coverage, such as
language related to ‘loss’ versus ‘cause of loss’ and anti-concurrent causation.75 Most courts
view an insurer’s failure to provide the policyholder proper notice of a material change in
coverage as grounds for denying the change’s effect.76
For example, in Buscher v. Economy Premier Assurance Company, the insurer amended
the plaintiff’s homeowner’s policy through restrictions that diminished coverage for mold.77 In
Minnesota, an insurer “has an affirmative duty to notify the insured by written explanation”
when the insurer makes changes to an existing policy that materially diminish coverage.78 In
fulfilling this duty, the insurer must provide the insured with a timely written endorsement,
accompanied by either a cover letter or “conspicuous heading to the amendatory endorsement,”
which explains the change in coverage.79 Because the insurer in Buscher, through its own
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admission, failed to strictly comply with Minnesota’s notice requirements, the court ruled that
the policyholder’s coverage for mold damage was not limited by the added restrictions.80
Conclusion
The speed with which insurers have acted to eliminate first-party property coverage for
mold makes the debate over mold coverage unique. Examining this recent wave of mold
exclusions, some courts are finding the language to be unclear for the reasonable consumer, who
is left wondering which forms of mold-related loss are excluded, and which may be covered
under their homeowner’s insurance. In the wake of recent court decisions, such as Liristis and
Simonetti, insurers are learning that traditional exclusion language – “we do not cover lost
caused by … mold” – is insufficient to successfully exclude all mold-related loss from their
policies. It is reasonable to predict a widespread tightening of mold exclusion language as
insurers refine and reshape their exclusions to specify that they do not cover mold as a ‘loss’ or
as a ‘cause of loss.’
However, the inevitability of more restrictive mold exclusions in the future should not
dissuade public insurance adjusters and plaintiff’s attorneys from including and arguing for mold
damage as a covered loss. Though there are courts, like Feiss, that deny mold coverage claims
based on a plain meaning interpretation of the policy, homeowners may still be eligible for
coverage, as yet other courts consider the policyholder’s reasonable expectations, the efficient
proximate cause doctrine, and compliance with notification requirements. In this rapidly shifting
environment of mold exclusion, it is essential that public insurance adjusters and policyholders’
attorneys remain up-to-date on current legal developments to ensure that policyholders receive
due consideration for their mold-related claims.
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